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FEATURE ARTICLE
The Communications Decency Act,
Congress' First Attempt to Censor Speech
over the Internet
by Lorraine Mercier
I. Introduction
In the past several years, the Internet has de-
veloped into the fastest growing, and potentially
most expansive, form of communication ever
known. Unlike any other medium, the Internet's
use and access has grown at exponential rates.'
Some studies estimate that as many as 40 mil-
lion users log onto the Internet each month.2 Law-
makers appear simply unable to keep pace with
the growth of the medium, and until recently, very
little regulation existed to monitor use. The Com-
munications Decency Act ("CDA"),3 however,
changed this.
This Article describes the development of the
Communications Decency Act, the legislative
history of the CDA, and the potential fate of the
CDA upon judicial review. Additionally, this Ar-
ticle describes the constitutional issues raised by
those who oppose the CDA, in
challenges relating to the First
Amendment. These challenges
to the CDA, recently argued be-
fore the Supreme Court, will
result in a decision which is ex-
pected to be handed down this
summer. Furthermore, this Ar-
ticle addresses how First
Amendment issues were ad-
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particular those
dressed by Congress, and considered by the
courts. Finally, this Article suggests that the CDA
should not survive the constitutional challenges
currently before the high Court, and suggests pos-
sible alternatives which are less intrusive upon
an individual's freedom of speech.
II. Background Information on the CDA
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed
into law the Telecommunications Competition
and Deregulation Act of 1996 (the "Telecom
Act").4 The Telecom Act is an amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934;1 it effectively de-
regulated a vast majority of telecommunications
media. In addition, the Telecom Act attempted
to provide "universal service" for all residential
consumers, by ensuring that people in rural ar-
eas have the same access to broadcast media as
individuals in metropolitan areas. The Telecom
Lorraine Mercier is an associate with The Law Office of
Charles A. Agbakwu, Sr. & Associates, a small firm in the
Denver Metro area. Her practice focuses on criminal de-
fense and employment litigation. Ms. Mercier received her
B.A. in history from the University of California Los Ange-
les in 1991, and her J.D. from the University of Colorado in
1995.
Volume 9, number 3
Act also attempted to force large telecommuni-
cations industries, especially network and cable
television companies, to allow for more compe-
tition by smaller, local companies. These goals
were applauded by many supporters of local and
small scale media broadcast.
While other telecommunications media cel-
ebrated the loosening of governmental control,
the Internet became, for the first time, subject to
federal regulation which seeks to censor content
on the Internet. Title V of the Telecommunica-
tions Act contains the Communications Decency
Act of 19966 ("CDA"), which, as enacted, re-
stricts the distribution of obscene or indecent ma-
terials over the Internet.7 The CDA was written
by then Senator James Exon, a democrat from
Nebraska. Condemning the evils of pornography
displayed over the Internet, Senator Exon cham-
pioned the passage of the CDA, this country's
first piece of legislation which regulates speech
over the Internet. 8
The CDA's stated purpose is to protect chil-
dren from access to indecent and obscene mate-
rials over the Internet and to "clean up" the
Internet. 9 The protection of children from obscen-
ity and indecency is certainly an important goal.
However, Congress' action of achieving this aim
is not without controversy and negative effects.
Congress' means included making the posting
of obscene and indecent materials a criminal act.
Despite rather vocal opposition to the CDA on
the Senate floor, Senator Exon eventually con-
vinced a majority of his colleagues that the CDA
was a necessary and appropriate measure for
fighting the evils of pornography on the Internet.
Fortunately for Internet Service Providers
("ISPs"), Internet users, and proponents of con-
stitutionally protected rights to free speech and
access to information, it appears that this law will
not stand. On June 11, 1996, the United States
District Court for the District of Eastern Penn-
sylvania, in ACLU v. Reno, held that the CDA
was unconstitutional and issued an injunction
against its enforcement.' 0 Additionally, on July
29, 1996, the Southern District of New York, in
Shea v. Reno held that the CDA was unconstitu-
tional as written." The Shea court agreed that an
injunction was appropriate under the circum-
stances.' 2 On December 7, 1996, on direct ap-
peal from the three judge panel inACLU v. Reno,
the issue came to the Supreme Court. Argument
was heard on March 19, 1997, and a decision is
expected by early July of this year.
The case before the Supreme Court is certain
to be a landmark decision which will help define
the future development of the Internet as a com-
munication medium in this country. If the review-
ing courts' decisions are overturned on appeal,
and the CDA is held constitutional, the ripple
effect will be far more substantial than the mem-
bers in Congress who voted in favor of the mea-
sure might imagine. The potential chill on the
freedom of speech presented by the CDA is too
great to allow this law to stand as written.
The CDA's criminalization of speech over the
Internet is impractical, inefficient, and ultimately
unconstitutional. The law, as written, is over-
broad, as it encompasses both constitutionally
protected and unprotected forms of expression.
Furthermore, the CDA impermissibly infringes
upon an individual's constitutionally protected
freedom of speech. Finally, there are several less
restrictive alternatives which Congress could
have considered prior to enacting the law which,
on its face, infringes upon an individual's First
Amendment rights. The Supreme Court should
realize these constitutional infirmities, and up-
hold the decisions of the courts of first impres-
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sion.
III. Criminal Law and the Internet
The CDA is not the only means by which one
can be prosecuted for speech or action over the
Internet. Criminal activity perpetrated over the
Internet has become a growing interest for both
lawmakers and intellectuals alike. Although this
article focuses on the CDA and the criminality
created thereunder, it is important to recognize
and understand that other criminal behaviors are
being discovered and prosecuted. These crimes
and prosecutions will continue to increase in
numbers as society begins to better understand
the capabilities available to an individual with a
computer, a modem, an Internet server, and a
phone line.
A. Non-speech related crimes
perpetrated over the Internet
A computer literate user enjoys a nearly un-
limited resource in the Internet. If this computer
know-how is tainted by criminal propensities, the
potential for criminal activity is enormous. With
a little tenacity, a computer-genius (or "hacker")
can use his or her computer knowledge to break
into others' computer systems and crack bank
codes, access personal information (including
credit card or social security numbers), determine
where one lives, a person's automobile informa-
tion, or even how much money someone makes.
An experienced hacker has almost unlimited ac-
cess to information and can intrude upon
another's business or personal affairs with vir-
tual ease.
Until recently, these crimes often went unpun-
ished, due to the difficulty in tracing the hacker
or because of limited understanding of the
hacker's ability to commit such crimes. Recently,
however, prosecutors and legislatures across the
country are increasing their awareness of the
hacker's criminal objectives. In fact, the behav-
ior of hackers encouraged the development of
new terms to describe and prosecute
"cybercrimes," such as: "cyberstalking," "com-
puter burglary," and "industrial computer espio-
nage.""3 The offenses range from teenage mis-
chief to serious malfeasance.' 4 Often, these
cyber-criminals lack any serious criminal intent. 5
Statistics show that young men in their late teens
seeking thrills by cracking codes and breaking
into others' computers commit the majority of
current computer related crimes. 6 However,
more serious computer criminals exist, and con-
tinue to present problems for law enforcement
agencies around the world. As a result, computer
crimes are being taken more seriously by pros-
ecutors, and the less threatening offenders are
being punished.
B. Prosecutions for speech over the
Internet
The computer crimes discussed in the above
section are not based upon the content of a com-
munication, but rather upon the act committed
in conjunction with that communication. Re-
cently, however, courts across the country have
begun to prosecute Internet users based upon the
content of their communications as well.' 7
One prosecution for speech involved a Uni-
versity of Texas student who was charged with
making a terrorist threat against California state
Senator Tim Leslie when he posted a message
on the Internet exclaiming, "Let's hunt Senator
Leslie for sport."' IProsecutors viewed this com-
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ment as a direct threat toward the Senator, and
charged the student under antiterrorism statutes.
Although the charges against the student were
ultimately dismissed, the fact that prosecutors
filed charges at all indicates the growing trend
of intolerance for suspect acts perpetrated over
the Internet.' 9
In addition, in November of 1996, a student
from the University of Irvine was indicted in fed-
eral court under a hate-crime statute for sending
an allegedly threatening message by E-mail to
approximately 60 other university students, most
of whom were Asian-American.' Prosecutors
alleged that the message contained threats to kill
the students if they refused to leave the campus.
U.S. Attorney Nora Manella believed that the E-
mail message was prompted by "a clear intent to
scare and intimidate Asian students, and to dis-
courage them from attending the university to
which they were lawfully admitted."2' Unlike the
University of Texas student, this California
student's charges are still pending, which pro-
vides further evidence that threats and harass-
ment perpetrated over the Internet will not be
tolerated.
IV. Communications Decency Act -
Legislative History
As the general public became increasingly
aware of the Internet as an important subculture
of mainstream society, it became obvious to
many members of Congress that legislation was
needed to regulate Internet use and content. Po-
litical pressure from all sides mounted, but
ultimately, those in favor of Internet censorship
prevailed. In addition to the opposition within
Congress, a number of special interest groups
pushed for the passage of broad legislation.22 One
such group was the Fairfax, Virginia organiza-
tion Enough-Is-Enough, an anti-pornography
group supportive of any legislation designed to
eliminate pornography.23
A. Three camps emerged in Senate
When Senator Exon first introduced the CDA,
the legislation faced serious opposition from po-
litical camps supporting various degrees of
Internet regulation. 24 In one camp, some mem-
bers of the Senate felt the law was too restrictive
upon an individual's freedoms of speech and
expression. This camp was led by Senator Patrick
Leahy, a democrat from Vermont. Senator Leahy
proposed a bill calling for a total lack of govern-
ment intervention in the Internet.' In another
camp on the other end of the spectrum, however,
sat Senator Grassley who believed that Senator
Exon's version did too little to protect people
from pornographic materials on the Internet. 26
Ultimately, the CDA faced brutal opposition from
many members of Congress, and debates erupted
about how the Internet should be treated under
the law. Under Senator Exon's version, ISPs were
afforded a number of affirmative defenses to
criminal prosecution. Senator Grassley's camp
disagreed with the CDA because it provides vari-
ous exemptions which protect ISPs under cer-
tain circumstances, whereas Senator Leahy's
camp opposed any congressional intervention at
all.28
B. Passage of Senator Exon's
version in the Senate
As the debates continued over whether Con-
gress needed to intervene and regulate the
Internet, Senator Exon attempted to inform other
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members of Congress about the extent of por-
nography on the Internet. To prove his point,
Senator Exon put together what he dubbed "The
Blue Book" - a notebook filled with sexually
explicit material allegedly downloaded from the
Internet.29 He then left the Blue Book on his desk
for all of his colleagues to peruse.30 In addition,
a study conducted by Marty Rimm of Carnegie
Mellon School of Law, which purported to ex-
pose the quantity of pornography and porno-
graphic materials available over the Internet, was
published at nearly the same time that Senator
Exon displayed the Blue Book.3' Mr. Rimm
claimed to have conducted extensive research on
the Internet, and ultimately concluded that a vast
majority (83.5%) of the images on Usenet
newsgroups (electronic bulletin boards) 32 depict
either hard or soft core pornography.3
Although Mr. Rimm's study is no longer con-
sidered accurate,34 it did create quite a stir when
first published. In an attempt to encourage stricter
regulation of the Internet, Senator Grassley
quickly distributed the Rimm study to members
of Congress.35 Although Senator Grassley was
still unable to garner enough support to pass his
own, more restrictive bill, the attention gener-
ated by the distribution of the Rimm Study, com-
bined with Senator Exon's display of the Blue
Book, seemed to have the effect of swaying mem-
bers who sat on the fence about the issue. 36 Ulti-
mately, members of the Senate passed Senator
Exon's middle of the road bill and sent the bill to
the House of Representatives for a vote.
C. The CDA's fate in the House of
Representatives
Although the bulk of the debates about the
CDA arose in the Senate, the House of Repre-
sentatives also questioned the Exon bill upon
presentation for a vote. Debates in the House
focused primarily on the appropriate standard for
regulation of speech.37 Some members argued
that the CDA should regulate only material which
is "harmful to minors. 38 Other members believed
that the indecency standard agreed upon by the
Senate should control the regulation of material.39
Still others agreed with Senator Grassley's more
restrictive bill, which would not allow ISPs the
protections offered in the Exon bill.' However,
the arguments in the House were not nearly as
vehement or protracted as those in the Senate.
Therefore, after brief debates, the Exon bill was
adopted by the House and presented to President
Clinton for final enactment, which occurred on
February 8, 1996.
V. The Content of the CDA
The CDA, as adopted, prohibits the knowing
distribution of obscene or indecent materials by
means of a telecommunications device to any-
one under 18 years old.4 ' The exact language of
the CDA reads:
Whoever in interstate or foreign com-
munications - by means of a telecom-
munications device knowingly -
makes, creates, or solicits, and initiates
the transmission of, any comment, re-
quest, suggestions, proposal, image or
other communication which is ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or in-
decent, with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass another person...
[or] initiates the transmission of any
comment, request, suggestion, pro-
posal, image, or other communication
which is obscene or indecent, know-
ing that the recipient of the communi-
278 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
000mr-
Volume 9, number 3
cation is under 18 years of age ... [or]
uses any interactive computer service
to display in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age, any
comment, request, suggestion, pro-
posal, image or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community stan-
dards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the user
of such service placed the call or initi-
ated the communication ... [shall be
fined or imprisoned under Title 18 of
the United States Code]. (emphasis
added).42
A person convicted of violating the CDA can be
sentenced to up to five years in prison and up to
$250,000 in fines.
As stated in the above section, Senator Exon's
affirmative defenses for ISPs were included in
the bill ultimately signed into law by President
Clinton.43 These escape clauses were drafted to
protect ISPs from prosecution under the CDA
for material which is not generated by the ISP
itself. Congress acknowledged that it would be
virtually impossible for an Internet provider to
monitor each of the thousands of images which
are uploaded each day.' Unless the ISP is an
active participant in the distribution of porno-
graphic materials, liability under the CDA will
not be found.45
Specifically, the CDA provides for three affir-
mative defenses: (1) ISPs which provide "mere
access" to a system or network are immune from
liability, so long as the connection does not in-
clude the creation of the content of the commu-
nication; 46 (2) employers are not held liable for
acts of their employees, unless the conduct is
ratified or recklessly disregarded; and, (3) the
CDA provides a good faith defense for provid-
ers who make efforts to comply with the stat-
ute . However, these protections are afforded
only to ISPs, and are not available to individual
users or subscribers.
VI. Court Set Limits on the Regulation of
Speech
The ability of Congress to regulate speech has
been addressed by the Supreme Court in decid-
ing First Amendment challenges. It is long es-
tablished by the Court that obscenity, although
indecent, may be regulated, but cannot be banned
outright.49 Congress was well aware of these limi-
tations when it drafted the CDA, and it appears
from the language that the CDA was written in
an attempt to avoid some of these constitutional
challenges.
A. The definition of obscenity and
the Miller v. California test
The first case to establish a definition of ob-
scenity under the law was Roth v. United States"
In that case, the Supreme Court held for the first
time that obscenity is not a protected form of
speech.5 However, Roth authorized only a very
limited reading of what constitutes "obscene ma-
terial." 2 The Roth definition required an inquiry
into whether "the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards [would deem
the material offensive,] and if the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to pruri-
ent interest."53 "Prurient interest" was then de-
fined as material having "a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts. 5 4 Although this definition was
the rule of law for many years, it provided little
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guidance to legislators and the courts in decid-
ing what is obscene. The ambiguous definition
has proved difficult to interpret and apply with
any degree of certainty.
For many years, lawmakers and judges
grappled with the definitions of "obscenity" and
"pornography." In fact, the terms are so general
mine what actually constitutes pornographic and
obscene material under the law.6 The Court cre-
ated a new test to determine whether material is
obscene, vacated the defendant's conviction and
remanded for application of the new definition
of obscenity.62
In Miller, five Justices agreed to amend Roth's
that no hard-line rules
have really ever been
established. In a con-
curring opinion in
Jacobellis v. Ohio,55
Justice Stewart con-
ceded that he could
not define pornogra-
phy in concrete or in-
telligible terms.56 In-
stead, he claimed, in-
stinct prevailed: "I
know it when it I see
it," he stated." The
majority opinion in
that case held that
materials should be
examined on a case-
by-case basis, evalu-
The Court reasoned that
"[i]t is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to
read the First Amendment
as requiring that the people
of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of
conduct found tolerable in
Las Vegas or New York
City."
definition of obscenity.
Roth's reasoning pro-
vided a basis for the new
definition, but the Miller
Court took the definition
even further, to provide
a more concrete defini-
tion of what is or is not
obscene. Miller devel-
oped a three-part test to
determine whether ma-
terial is obscene.63 Un-
der this test, each of the
three elements must be
established to determine
that the specific work is
obscene.64 First, the
work "taken as a whole,
[must appeal] to the pru-
ating the material individually and in context.5
This individual case-by-case approach continues
to be the method for determining whether mate-
rial constitutes pornography.
The modern definition of obscenity was set
forth by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Califor-
nia. 9 The defendant in that case was a salesman
who sent unsolicited advertisements depicting
explicit sexual activity to unwilling recipients
through the mail.' The defendant was convicted
of violating antiobscenity and antipronography
laws. He appealed his conviction to the Supreme
Court, which agreed to hear that matter to deter-
rient interest."65 Second, the work must "[depict]
or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the statute. 66
And, finally, the work must "[lack] serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value."'67 Miller
rejects many earlier definitions or standards
which had been used to determine whether ma-
terial is obscene. 68 For example, an earlier Su-
preme Court plurality opinion stated that the
material must be "utterly without social value"
to be deemed obscene. 69 The Miller Court set
forth that the material need not be "utterly" val-
ueless, but only "without serious" value. By
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changing this standard, the decision expanded
the definition of what is obscene.
In addition, Miller sets forth the idea that a
national community standard should not be ap-
plied to make the determination of what is ob-
scene, but rather the material is to be judged by
a local standard. Courts are not to apply "some
hypothetical standard of the United States,"7 ° but
rather the community where the obscene mate-
rial originated, or for Mr. Miller, the community
standards of the state of California. The Court
reasoned that "[i]t is neither realistic nor consti-
tutionally sound to read the First Amendment as
requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found toler-
able in Las Vegas or New York City."7' The Miller
opinion is written in a manner which suggests
that a more restrictive community should not be
forced to accept the looser morals of a less re-
stricted community. However, presumably the
logic works in the reverse as well, and would
not allow a more restricted community to guide
the morals of a less restricted one.
Finally, the Miller decision established strict
criteria by which a state could regulate obscene
materials. Under Miller, a state can only ban
materials which constitute "hard core" pornog-
raphy.72 Because there are so many postings on
the Internet, it would be practically impossible
to analyze each individual posting under the
Miller test. Therefore, Congress attempted to
clarify the scope of the regulation of the Internet
with the CDA.
B. The modem definition of
indecency under FCC v.
Pacifica
Not only have courts struggled to define ob-
scenity and pornography in concrete terms, they
have also struggled to define "offensive mate-
rial" and "indecency" in some practical man-
ner. In Pacifica, the Court addressed the de-
cency of a monologue written by comedian
George Carlin entitled "Filthy Words,"73 which
contained several passages of vulgar and of-
fensive language.74 The matter came before the
Court based on a Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") ruling which deemed the
monologue "indecent" and inappropriate for
radio broadcast at a time when children might
listen. A radio station appealed the decision by
the FCC, which was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Subsequently, the FCC petitioned for certio-
rari and the Supreme Court heard the case for
a determination of the issues.
In an opinion written by Justice Stewart, the
Court held that while Mr. Carlin's monologue
did not rise to the level of obscenity, the lan-
guage was considered "indecent." The Court
focused its opinion on whether the FCC had
authority to ban the indecent material from
radio broadcast, or whether such action vio-
lated the First Amendment. 5
In Pacifica, the Court differentiated inde-
cent materials from obscene materials.76 The
Court acknowledged that certain communica-
tions, while not necessarily obscene, could be
restricted without violating the First Amend-
ment.' The language in Carlin's monologue
contained language which described "sexual
or excretory activities in a patently offensive
manner,"'78 and was therefore deemed indecent.
The Court held that the material need not "ap-
peal to prurient interest" to be deemed inde-
cent, but rather that this requirement was re-
served for obscene materials.7 9 The question
then became whether the FCC has authority to
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regulate "indecent" material, or whether the au-
thority is limited to "obscene" material. Ulti-
mately, the Court determined that although the
material was not "obscene" (and thus could not
be banned outright), the FCC's action was ap-
propriate and justified.80 Therefore, the Court
held that the FCC action did not violate the
broadcaster's First Amendment rights.8'
This decision is important because the Court
set forth the criteria by which the FCC could re-
strict the broadcast of indecent (rather than ob-
scene) material. The Court identified the unique
elements of the medium presented, in this case
radio, as well as the "pervasiveness" of the me-
dium. 82 The Court noted that radio is "uniquely
pervasive," and "uniquely accessible to children,
even those too young to read."83 The Court held
that the unique qualities of the telecommunica-
tions medium must be considered when analyz-
ing a statute under the First Amendment.' Al-
though certain restrictions may be valid with re-
gard to one medium, the same restriction may
be impermissible with regard to another.' For
example, the FCC promulgated stricter regula-
tions for television and radio broadcast than for
newsprint.86 Stricter regulations are justified
based upon the pervasive nature of television and
radio. In other words, the Court determined that
the accessibility of the medium to the general
public is an important factor in determining the
degree of regulation. Radio and television are
considered pervasive in nature, and therefore
stricter regulations are warranted.87
In Pacifica, the Court discussed at length the
differences between various forms of communi-
cation, the ease of access to those media, and
why each must be treated individually.' The
unique qualities of each medium make it neces-
sary and appropriate for the application of indi-
vidualized standards of decency. This rationale
explains why cable television stations may air
uncut, R-rated films at certain times, while net-
work broadcasting may not do the same. Cable
television is less "pervasive" than network tele-
vision, because it requires a monthly service fee
and additional equipment, such as a cable wire
or cable box. Furthermore, a person can limit or
expand the channels available to him or her by
subscribing to fewer or more stations. Hence, the
Court determined that while Mr. Carlin's mono-
logue was not obscene, it must not be aired on
the radio at times when children are likely to be
listening.
Unlike other forms of mass communication,
the Internet is only accessible to those who sub-
scribe. Although availability is expanding, the
present need to subscribe to an online service is
analogous to the need to purchase cable televi-
sion in your home. Both forms of communica-
tion require a person to subscribe to a service
prior to gaining access. Therefore, it is logical
that the Internet, like cable television, is not per-
vasive in nature, and at this time, cannot be regu-
lated as such.
C. Sable Communications of
California, Inc. v. FCC
Another case which bears upon the issues pre-
sented by the enactment of the CDA is Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC.89 The
plaintiff in Sable was a service provider of sexu-
ally oriented recorded telephone messages ("dial-
a-porn").0 The Los Angeles based company con-
tracted with Pacific Bell to have special phone
lines to provide the telephone sex lines. Users
were charged a special fee for the service which
was collected by Pacific Bell and then divided
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between the phone company and the message
provider. The messages were available to people
outside the Los Angeles area for an additional
long distance toll by simply dialing the area code
and number.9' The plaintiff in this case brought
suit to enjoin the FCC or the federal government
from prosecuting under the 1988 Amendment to
the Communications Act,92 a precursor to the
CDA. In addition, Sable sought an injunction
against enforcement of the 1988 Amendment to
the Communications Act, which imposed a
"blanket prohibition on indecent as well as ob-
scene" interstate telephone messages.93 The 1988
statute targeted at dial-a-porn services, just as the
1996 Amendment directly targets Internet Ser-
vices. Sable is of particular interest to this Ar-
ticle, because the arguments raised are essentially
the same arguments raised in opposition to the
CDA. The Court's opinion in Sable provides
some insight into how it may decide the present
issues regarding the CDA.
The plaintiff's argument for an injunction in
Sable focused on two constitutional challenges.
First, the plaintiff argued that the law "creates
an impermissible national standard of obscen-
ity" in violation of Miller's "contemporary com-
munity standards" rule.94 Second, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the 1988 Amendment was overbroad;
in other words, it was not "narrowly drawn to
serve [the government's stated] purpose."'95 Al-
though the Court rejected the plaintiff's first ar-
gument the law was stricken on plaintiff's sec-
ond challenge that it was overbroad. 96 The Court
noted that although the FCC maintains the au-
thority to regulate indecent speech, the param-
eters by which they may do so are quite strict. 97
The Court acknowledged that the FCC can place
an outright ban on dial-a-porn messages which
are obscene, however, this right to regulate does
not apply to messages which are merely inde-
cent, and not obscene. 98
In its opinion, the Court distinguished Sable
from Pacifica by noting that the 1988 statute (in
question in Sable) imposed a total ban on the
indecent phone messages, while Pacifica in-
volved only a ban during certain times when chil-
dren are likely to listen.99 The CDA imposes the
same, Sable form outright ban, on indecent com-
munications over the Internet. The reasoning the
Court used to determine that the statute in ques-
tion in Sable was unconstitutional should be fol-
lowed when the court rules on the CDA this sum-
mer. The CDA, like the earlier amendment, is
overbroad, and fails to satisfy the requirements
set forth by the Supreme Court that indecent ma-
terial may not be completely banned.
D. Incorporation of precedent into
the CDA
The CDA incorporates the language of both
Miller and Pacifica into its definitions. By in-
cluding the reference to "contemporary commu-
nity standards," Congress attempted to codify the
standard set forth in the Miller test. Furthermore,
the CDA's prohibition against "indecent" mate-
rials, and those which are "patently offensive"
or depict "sexual or excretory activities or or-
gans" essentially codifies the indecency standard
set forth in Pacifica.
Presumably, Congress chose to incorporate the
Supreme Court's definitions and language from
Miller and Pacifica into the CDA to avoid po-
tential, anticipated constitutional challenges.
Congress' utilization of the exact language em-
ployed by the Court indicates Congress' reliance
that the application of those standards to the regu-
lation of the Internet would withstand constitu-
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tional challenges. It was likely believed that since
the Court already visited these issues, and cre-
ated definitions which were acceptable under
other circumstances, these definitions would sus-
tain future challenges as well. While the congres-
sional intent appears proper, constitutional chal-
lenges arose nonetheless, and the CDA has been
under fire since its enactment in February, 1996.
VII. Constitutional Challenges to the
CDA
The CDA, as adopted, leaves far too many
areas unclear and three main constitutional prob-
lems with the CDA exist. Namely,
1) the CDA fails to differentiate between
the legal definitions of obscenity and indecency,
regulating both equally;
2) the CDA fails to recognize the unique-
ness of the Internet as a medium of communica-
tion; and,
3) the CDA is overbroad in its language
and application.
Each of these issues presents a valid constitu-
tional challenge to the CDA, and, in itself, may
render the law unconstitutional.
A. The battle between obscenity
and indecency
The first constitutional problem is that the
CDA fails to differentiate between obscenity and
indecency, and the CDA proscribes the transmis-
sion of both. Although all obscene material may
be banned,"° the Supreme Court has held that
indecent material may only be regulated, and this
regulation must pass a strict scrutiny test.'0' In
other words, the law must be narrowly tailored
to accomplish a compelling government inter-
est. 02 It is not clear that the CDA was drafted
narrowly enough to be considered the "least re-
strictive means" available to accomplish the
government's goals.
Under Miller, any Internet posting must be
judged according to contemporary community
standards to determine whether the material is
indecent or obscene.' 3 One must determine, how-
ever, whose community is in issue when evalu-
ating whether the material may be banned as
obscene or whether the material may simply be
regulated as indecent. If an allegedly obscene
image is uploaded0 4 in New York City and sub-
sequently downloaded in Lincoln, Nebraska, the
community standards will be different. The ap-
plication of different community standards man-
dates a different result under the Miller test, as
some communities may find material obscene
while another community may simply describe
the material as indecent.
Furthermore, there is a valid argument that the
Internet itself is a community of sorts, and there-
fore the appropriate community standard is that
of Internet users and subscribers across the coun-
try. Consider that allegedly 83.5% of Usenet
groups contain some form of obscene material.'0
If this is true, and if the Internet itself is the com-
munity by which the material is to be judged,
clearly the community standards would be quite
relaxed in comparison to most communities
across the country. Applying this "Internet Com-
munity" standard to material being posted on the
Internet would allow for less regulation of
postings, as a higher volume of material would
be deemed indecent as opposed to obscene.
Congress failed to address the different stan-
dards which apply to obscene materials and those
which apply to indecent material may render the
CDA unconstitutional. The CDA effectively bans
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material that is both obscene and indecent, an
unconstitutional infringement on the rights pro-
vided by the First Amendment's free speech pro-
vision.
B. The CDA unconstitutionally
bans both obscene and indecent
language
To overcome a presumption that banning an
indecent communication is unconstitutional, the
government must establish a valid governmen-
tal interest and the law must be narrowly tai-
lored. °6 The drafters of the CDA were well aware
of potential challenges based on the First Amend-
ment. 107 In fact, many efforts were taken to di-
rectly combat these challenges. However, despite
those efforts, it quickly became apparent that the
CDA failed to consider the unique qualities of
the Internet. The qualities which should have
been considered were that the Internet, unlike
other forms of communication, requires substan-
tial efforts on the part of the user, to be accessed.
In addition, unlike radio and television, infor-
mation from the Internet does not simply flow to
the user simply by logging onto the Internet. An
Internet user must actively search for informa-
tion to receive it. Congress' failure to address
these characteristics may be enough to declare
the CDA unconstitutional, as it is not narrowly
tailored to advance the government's interest.
Cybercensors rant that any child might browse
the Internet and innocently stumble upon
cybersmut. However, in reality, that child does
not have access to the Internet without a com-
puter, modem, phone line, and a membership-
paid Internet subscriber account. The Internet is
unique in this sense. The unique characteristics
of the Internet must be considered when the Court
evaluates whether a law is narrowly tailored. 0 8
Furthermore, unlike television, radio, or even
print media, "time, place and manner" restric-
tions are unavailable to an Internet provider. Tele-
vision and radio companies can modify their pro-
gramming based upon the time of day or likely
audience. Over the Internet, however, this is im-
possible. Although certain subjects may be in-
appropriate for children, once an item has been
posted on the Internet, it is accessible at any time.
It is therefore impossible to require an ISP to limit
indecent communications to certain times of day.
The inability to regulate the Internet by using
time restrictions results in a outright ban of any
indecent material that may be accessible to chil-
dren. Accordingly, the overreaching result un-
constitutionally prohibits the transmission of in-
decent material designed exclusively for adults.
C. Overbreadth of the scope of the
CDA
The third constitutional problem with the CDA
is that the law is too all-encompassing. In fact,
during the Congressional debates, some mem-
bers of Congress, spearheaded by Senator Leahy,
challenged the law for being overbroad. °9 This
point was successfully argued in Shea v. Reno."'
During the Senate debates, Senator Leahy
pointed out that a librarian might be in violation
of the statute for posting a copy of the Catcher
in the Rye over the Internet, which uses indecent
language in parts, as might a museum curator
for posting a photograph of Michelangelo's
David, which depicts full male nudity.' While
supporters of the CDA might argue that these
works would be exempted under the serious ar-
tistic or literary value exemption, it is unlikely
that a librarian or a museum curator cares to be
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prosecuted under the CDA to test the theory.
It has even been suggested that the Supreme
Court has violated the statute by uploading its
opinion inFCC v. Pacifica.' 2 The opinion quoted
large portions of George Carlin's monologue
"Filthy Words," and contained many passages
which the Court deemed indecent. Ironically,
under the CDA, the Court itself may be in viola-
tion of the law for posting this opinion. The over-
breadth of the CDA indicates that the law is not
narrowly tailored, and therefore the CDA should
be found unconstitutional.
D. Jurisdictional problems of the
CDA
Although jurisdiction would not render the
CDA unconstitutional, the CDA's application is
aggravated due to such problems. Although the
CDA applies to all communications originating
in the United States, it is inapplicable with re-
spect to cyberporn which is uploaded outside of
our territories. Some theorize that nearly 75% of
the pornographic material available on the
Internet is of foreign origination and would not
be removed by the terms of the CDA."3 If the
true intent of the statute is to protect children,
certainly there must be a more effective way of
doing so than ridding the Internet of 25% of the
pornographic material. Furthermore, cybersmut-
peddlers from the United States can avoid the
law by simply setting up their operations out-
side the country. Without international coopera-
tion, the implementation of cybercensorship be-
comes rather meaningless.
Various proposals have been offered for inter-
national cooperation in cleaning up the Internet.
The problem that arises, however, is that each
country has its own standards of decency. The
laws of some countries, such as the Netherlands,
are substantially more liberal than other areas in
the world. Other countries, however, have more
rigid standards regarding pornography than the
United States does. These differing standards
make international cooperation difficult to
achieve, and the CDA does nothing to confront
this issue.
VIII. Legal Challenges to the CDA - The
Judiciaries' Opinions
A. ACLU v. Reno
On June 11, 1996, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held inACLU v. Reno that the CDA, as adopted,
is unconstitutional." 4 In a lengthy opinion, the
judges set forth their reasons for finding that the
CDA violates the individual's constitutionally
protected rights. The judges held that the plain-
tiffs in the suit demonstrated a reasonable
probability of eventual success on the merits, and
therefore, an injunction was appropriate." I5 Fur-
thermore, the judges agreed that the law itself is
unconstitutional, which also necessitated an in-
junction against the enforcement of the CDA."16
However, while the judges concurred in the re-
sult, the rationales used to reach their respective
decisions were not in congruence.
1. Preliminary matters and
factual background
The plaintiffs in this suit include The Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), Planned
Parenthood, various libraries, computer compa-
nies, journalists, educators, and health care pro-
viders from across the country. Each plaintiff
indicated concern about material it had posted
on the Internet and sought clarification from the
Courts by bringing a motion for preliminary in-
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junction against Janet Reno, the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, and the United States
Department of Justice ("Government")."17
Planned Parenthood, for example, stated that cer-
tain information it posted with regard to abor-
tions, teenage pregnancy, or contraceptives,
might be deemed "indecent" and in volation of
the CDA."8 Other plaintiffs expressed similar
concerns based on various postings which may
contain indecent material. The plaintiffs chal-
lenged the statute based on the potential chill over
speech on the Internet. Under § 561(c) of the
Telecom Act, cases challenging the provisions
of the CDA are to be heard by a three-judge panel
from a federal district court.' 9 The panel is to be
designated by the Chief Judge from the federal
circuit in which the matter is to be heard. There-
fore, this case was heard by a three-judge panel
at the United Stated District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania.
The parties stipulated to a vast majority of the
factual bases for the claims. 20 Included in these
stipulations were the historical and technologi-
cal development of the Internet, as well as infor-
mation relating to the Internet's use and access.
The disputed facts, however, surround the abil-
ity of an individual to restrict access to unwanted
materials over the Internet.' 2' The plaintiffs ar-
gued that an Internet user can utilize several
means of restricting unwanted materials without
the CDA, whereas the Government argued that
those means are not readily available.
2. Flaws in the
Government's reasoning
The court's opinion discusses at length the
characteristics of the Internet as a medium of
communication. In addition, the opinion ad-
dressed a number of the problems raised in this
Article, including the problem of the lack of in-
ternational enforceability. After a detailed intro-
duction on the qualities and characteristics of the
Internet, the court proceeded to attack each of
the often cited defenses to the CDA. For example,
the Government defended the CDA based upon
the possibility of credit card verification for age
and identity of Internet users. 22 Credit card veri-
fication would require a user to type in his or her
credit card number, which would then be veri-
fied by the Internet to ensure that the credit card
number is valid. The court dismissed this option
as technically impossible at this time. 23 Further-
more, the court noted that mere possession of a
credit card does not ensure that the user is of the
proper age. 124 In addition, credit card verifica-
tion prohibits the use of Internet services for
adults who do not possess credit cards. Finally,
the court reasoned, even if credit card verifica-
tion were possible at this time, it is impractical
and unfeasible, as it is costly and would cause
delays in the transmission of information. 25
Therefore, the court held that the credit card so-
lution to monitoring who is using the Internet
was not sufficient.' 26
The Government also argued that potentially
indecent material could be tagged, or rated, by
Internet providers. 27 The court found this sug-
gestion to be equally impractical. The court rec-
ognized the functional impossibility for a pro-
vider to review every item which flows through
its system onto the Internet. Furthermore, the
court acknowledged that if parents choose to
screen the material, the software exists for them
to do so privately.' 28
Next, the court addressed the concerns about
a user's right to privacy. The court stressed that
an individual is entitled to the right to access in-
formation relating to sensitive topics, such as
AIDS, homosexual issues, or prison rape, with-
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out concern for whether his name will later be
tied to such a topic. Users have a right to remain
anonymous, and the Government's position in-
fringes upon that right.
Finally, the court addressed the issues of in-
decency and obscenity. The court held that the
statute was invalid on its face, as it purports to
ban merely indecent material, as well as obscene
products.2 9 This ban could not be reconciled with
the Supreme Court's holding in Miller that the
United States Constitution prohibits banning in-
decent material; accordingly, the court struck
down the CDA. 13°
Although each of the individual judges pub-
lished a separate opinion, all reached the same
ultimate conclusion: the CDA violates the United
States Constitution. Judge Sloviter criticized the
CDA's interchangeable use of "indecent" with
"patently offensive."' 3' He agreed that a regula-
tion of indecent speech is subject to strict scru-
tiny, and that despite a valid governmental pur-
pose, the law could not withstand such an ex-
amination. Judge Buckwalter focused his opin-
ion on the statute's overbreadth and vagueness.
Lastly, Judge Dalzell's opinion combines aspects
of each of the others, arriving at the same con-
clusion. For the time being, at least, the CDA is
not enforceable law in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
B. Shea v. Reno - The second
attack on the CDA
Since the decision in ACLU was issued, a
three-judge panel in the Southern District of New
York heard arguments in a similiar case, Shea v.
Reno, in July of 1996. 32 In Shea (the plaintiff), a
publisher of an electronic newspaper, took issue
with the CDA's criminalization of the transmis-
sion of indecent materials over the Internet. 33 In
this case, the plaintiff argued that the CDA was
both vague and overbroad. The Government's po-
sition in this case was identical to their position
in ACLU, and these points were again argued to
the panel.
Similar to ACLU, many of the factual matters
were stipulated by the parties. The Shea court,
like theACLU court, engaged in a long narrative
about the historical development of the Internet
and its access. In addition, the Shea court set forth
a detailed description of its findings with regard
to the availability to sexually explicit material
over the Internet. Finally, Shea also noted sev-
eral alternatives to the CDA for shielding mi-
nors from access to indecent materials over the
Internet.
In Shea, the court did not strike the CDA as
unconstitutionally vague. 134 Additionally, the
plaintiff argued that the indecency standard in-
cluded in the CDA failed to convey to reason-
ably intelligent people what conduct was pro-
hibited and which was allowed.' 35 The court dis-
agreed with the plaintiff on this issue, and pointed
out that the CDA's indecency standard was
adopted directly from Pacifica. 136 Since the Paci-
fica court upheld its indecency standard against
a vagueness challenge, the Shea court would not
consider this argument. In other words, the court
deferred to precedent.
However, the court did agree with the
plaintiff's argument that the CDA is substantially
overbroad.' 3 The court agreed that the CDA's
prohibition against the transmission of indecent
materials between consenting adults could not
be justified. 38 This court found that the CDA was
"not narrowly tailored, in that it fails to preserve
for adults the ability to engage in certain consti-
tutionally protected communications--effec-
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tively acting as a total ban on indecent commu-
nications by interactive computer systems. "139
This ban, the court reasoned, is unwarranted and
unconstitutional. Therefore, the court agreed with
the plaintiffs (and with theACLU court), that the
CDA was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the
court agreed that an injunction against its enforce-
ment was appropriate under the circumstances.
The court's opinion, along with the opinion in
ACLU, will provide a basis for the Supreme Court
to make its ruling this summer.
IX. Possible Alternatives to the CDA
In light of the decisions in both ACLU and
Shea, and the strong opposition to the CDA, it
seems appropriate to consider which alternatives
are available to an Internet user who hopes to
screen out indecent materials. If the reviewing
courts' decisions are affirmed, it will be neces-
sary to find other means of monitoring the mate-
rials available over the Internet. It is difficult to
accept an argument that the CDA is in fact the
least restrictive means of accomplishing the
government's goals with regard to speech over
the Internet. There are at least two alternatives
to address the problem of pornography on the
Internet.
A. Platform for Internet content
selection
In Congress, opponents of the CDA have sug-
gested a less restrictive alternative, the use of the
Platform for Internet Content Selection
("PICS").' 4 This system was developed by the
Internet Consortium in an attempt to put forth
technical standards by which parents could
screen certain material on the Internet from their
children. Essentially, PICS establishes a rating
system for Internet sites, in much the same way
television programs are currently being rated.
The first screen displayed contains a written
warning, detailing the potentially unsuitable
material contained therein, and its character. No
questionable materials are displayed for several
screens, all of which contain disclaimers with
regard to content.
Currently, many mainstream computer and
Internet providers are members of the PICS
working group, 4' and membership continues to
grow. Registration with PICS is not difficult.
ISP's can either rate their own websites, apply-
ing the criteria set forth by PICS, or they can
request that the service rate the site. Sites are rated
for four categories: nudity, violence, sex, and
language. If the site "passes" PICS's evaluation,
the site may display a PICS logo on the screen. 42
However, critics of the PICS system point out
that the task of rating each site posted on the
Internet would be extremely difficult to accom-
plish, because there is simply too much infor-
mation being transmitted from day to day. How-
ever, the availability of the PICS system is evi-
dence of less restrictive means of addressing the
problem.
B. Available software to self-
censor the Internet
Another alternative to the CDA is available
through various software packages which screen
Internet sites for explicit or offensive materials. 141
The first software program available to parents
or others who wished to screen explicit or offen-
sive materials from the Internet was Cyber Pa-
trol, from Microsystems Software, Inc. Another
such program is CyberNOT, which screens for
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violence, profanity, partial nudity, nudity, sexual
acts, drugs, alcohol, gambling, and a number of
other questionable topics. With CyberNOT, par-
ents can choose which, if any, of the categories
to screen, and which, if any, to allow. If, for ex-
ample, the parent of a teenager does not want
him to have access to materials on militant ex-
tremist groups such as the Michigan Militia, but
does not mind if the child has access to informa-
tion about sex or drugs, those items can be se-
lectively screened out. There are dozens of pro-
grams of this type available on the market. Many
of these programs are available for around $50
and can be purchased at any computer store. Fur-
thermore, many of the online service providers
offer screening software, often free of charge,
with their service.4This type of software is an-
other example of an alternative means of moni-
toring the Internet without infringing upon an
individual's freedom.
IX. Conclusion
As the trial courts recognized in ACLU and
Shea, the CDA is unconstitutional. The CDA is
not narrowly drawn to achieve its stated purpose,
and therefore cannot survive a strict scrutiny re-
view. Of course, the protection of children from
indecent and obscene materials is a compelling
goal under the circumstances. However, less re-
strictive means are available which afford a per-
son the option to privately screen her online ma-
terials, without the government's interference
into her personal or private life. These alterna-
tives should be better publicized so that the gen-
eral population of Internet users is aware of the
options available.
Presently, the CDA awaits review by the Su-
preme Court. If the decisions of the courts of first
impression are thoroughly read and properly un-
derstood, it seems that the only possible deci-
sion which can be reached is to affirm the rul-
ings. The ACLU and Shea courts took great
strides toward understanding all of the nuances
which were involved by educating themselves
about the medium, the technology, and the alter-
natives available. The decisions are well in-
formed and correct, and deserve recognition as
such. The CDA is a poorly written law, fueled
by ignorance and hype. Two courts recognized
this and took steps toward remedying this injus-
tice.
What does this mean to a parent who is con-
cerned about her child learning to use the
Internet? Does it mean that a child must be
watched at all times to ensure that he doesn't
access erotica.net? Perhaps, but probably not.
Parents need to educate themselves first, and then
begin to educate their children. Learn what is out
there on the seemingly infinite Internet, learn how
to screen materials which are inappropriate for
children, and then teach these skills to them. This
is truly the safest way to travel on the informa-
tion superhighway..
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is free of charge and relatively simple to use.
243 A number of screening software packages are currently avail-
able to the consumer, including Cyber Patrol, CYBERsitter,
Net Nanny, and Surf Watch, to name only a few.
' 4 Currently, America Online, Compuserve, and Prodigy offer
such packages.
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